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iv

ARGUMENT
I.

THE EMPLOYER DID NOT RELY ON ARGUMENTS, AFFIDAVITS,
AND STATEMENTS THAT WERE NOT IN EVIDENCE BEFORE THE
ALJ OR ACCEPTED INTO EVIDENCE UPON APPEAL OR
RECONSIDERATION BY THE BOARD.
The Appellee's brief makes the general assertion that many of the Appellant's (the

"Employer") arguments in its brief relied on "statements, arguments, and affidavits" that
were not in evidence before the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") or that were not
accepted into evidence upon appeal or reconsideration by the Workforce Appeals Board
(the "Board"). (Appellee's Brief at 5, 6, 9.)
However, the Board prepared and submitted to the Court the 193-page record in
this case.

(CA 1-193.)

The Appellee also filed with the Court an Answer and

Certification of Record dated February 24, 2010, wherein the Appellee and the Board
specifically certified that the 193-page record constituted "a full, true, and correct
record... being all the proceedings and all the evidence in the case." The Employer
thereafter cited in its brief only to those documents contained in these 193 pages.
Further, all of the documents cited in the Employer's brief were before the Board upon
appeal or reconsideration. The Board, in its decision or otherwise, did not reject any
particular document, filing, or affidavit in the 193-page record as not properly before it.
In its brief, the Employer particularly relied on and properly cited to Exhibits 1
through 21 (the "Exhibits"), which were assembled and stamped as exhibits by the
Department of Workforce Services (the "Department"), which were then presented and
l

entered into the record by the ALJ at the hearing in this matter (the "Hearing") and which
were uncontested by either the claimant, Stephen Vuyk (the "Claimant"), or the
Employer. (CA 001-24.) The record also contains, and the Employer properly cited to
and relied on, the transcript of the Hearing (the "Transcript"). (CA 025-044.) Both the
Exhibits and the Transcript were made by the Board, and certified by the Appellee, a part
of the record in this case. (CA 001-044.)
After the ALJ issued her opinion in this matter, the Employer appealed to the
Board, which appeal included a notice of appeal and a memorandum in support. These
documents were made by the Board, and certified by the Appellee, a part of the record in
this case. (CA 45-74.) The Employer attached as an exhibit to such appeal a letter sent
to the Claimant informing him of supplemental grounds for his termination, which
document was specifically stamped by the Department as properly received and which
was also made by the Board, and certified by the Appellee, a part of the record in this
case. (CA 052-53.)
In response to the Board's misapplication in its decision of many of the facts in
this matter to the operative legal provisions in this case, the Employer thereafter
submitted a request for reconsideration to the Board, which request and supporting
memorandum also included as exhibits two affidavits from the executive director and the
clinic manager of the Employer (the "Affidavits"). The Affidavits were before the Board
on reconsideration (which motion the Board refused to consider), were specifically
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stamped as received and accepted by the Board, and were made by the Board, and
certified by the Appellee, a part of the record in this case. (CA 105-119, 144-181.)
The Affidavits were submitted to shed light on certain (and apparently ambiguous)
facts in the Exhibits and the Transcript from which the Board in its decision (by
erroneously extrapolating and speculating on those fact?) made certain strained and
erroneous conclusions, including the Board's completely unwarranted suspicion of the
Employer's 2009 discipline log with respect to the Claimant (the "Log"), which
document was obtained from the Employer upon request by the Department in
connection with the Department's initial investigation of the Claimant's unemployment
claim, which was submitted into evidence by the ALJ at the Hearing, which was
authenticated by the Employer at the Hearing, and which Was certified by the Appellee as
a part of the record in this case. (CA 009-011, 028.) Without rehashing the points made
in the Employer's brief, two quick examples of the Board's erroneous extrapolations
from the Exhibits and the Transcript include: (1) the Board indicated that the Employer
was "likely" able to experience success in fund raising after the Claimant was terminated
due to the twelve to thirteen events that the Claimant $et up while employed (issue
discussed in more detail below, but the Claimant did not in fact have twelve to thirteen
future events planned and further the Employer did not in fact experience any fundraising success from the Claimant's efforts) and (2) the Board indicated that, because the
Employer attempted to manage the Claimant's time by making him clock in and out, such
a requirement actually contributed to the Claimant's failure at his job.
3

(CA 079,

Appellant's Brief at Addendum B.)

Such speculative conclusions are not based on

reasonable inferences from the Exhibits or the Transcript and are simply not true.
While affidavits are commonly regarded by courts as weak evidence generally, the
Affidavits do not contradict any prior testimony and were supplemental in nature; and
such were simply submitted to the Board upon reconsideration to clarify certain
ambiguous facts in the Exhibits and the Transcript, and in particular submitted to clarify
the Board's erroneous conclusions extrapolated from those facts. While perhaps not
particularly dispositive, such supplemental affidavits are generally admissible. See, e.g.,
AMJUR Affidavits § 19.

Affidavits are also contemplated and admissible in other

contexts, such as motions for summary judgment. See, e.g., Calvert v. Smith's Food &
Drug Centers, Inc., 2007 WL 4207198 (D. Utah 2007). It would be inequitable to permit
the Board in its decision to speculate from the Exhibits and the Transcript, but then throw
out as inadmissible the Affidavits, which were properly attached to the Employer's
motion for reconsideration, which were made by the Board a part of the record in this
case, and which were submitted to address the Board's own erroneous speculations.
Regardless, the Employer properly cites to, and indeed entirely relies on, the facts
in the Exhibits and the Transcript to support its arguments; references in the Employer's
brief and elsewhere to the Affidavits are meant to supplement and clarify the facts in the
Exhibits and the Transcript. Accordingly, the Affidavits (and the rest of the documents in
the 193-page record for that matter) are admissible and should at least be considered by
the Court regarding speculative conclusions in the Board's decision.
4

II.

THE EMPLOYER DID NOT FAIL TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE.
The Appellee's brief claims that the Employer either failed to marshal the

evidence or that the Employer marshaled only that evideiice supporting its contentions
and ignored any evidence to the contrary. (Appellee's Brief at 24.)
The Employer argued in its brief, and does again presently, that the standard of
review in this matter is the misinterpretation and misapplication of the facts to the
operative legal provisions, namely Utah Admin. Code sections R994-405-202(2)("Rule
2") and R994-405-202(3)("Rule 3"), and not the finding of facts themselves.
(Appellant's Brief at 1-4.) Further, the Board's interpretation of the plain language of
Rules 2 and 3 are to be given no deference and are reviewed for correctness.
(Appellant's Brief at 1-3.) Accordingly, the Employer need not marshal the evidence.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Employer had to marshal the evidence in its brief,
the Employer did in fact do so. The Appellee's brief makes the conclusory statement
(and presumably a standard argument made in most if not jail of Appellee's cases before
this Court) that "the Employer made no attempt to nfieet its marshaling burden."
(Appellee's Brief at 25.) Such is simply not true. The Employer did in fact make some
attempt to (and the Employer argues presently it in fact did) clearly present the relevant
facts in its brief; roughly six pages of thirty-one separate statements of fact devoted to
that effort. (Appellant's Brief at 6-11.)
Appellee's brief makes the alternate but similarly conclusory statement that the
Employer marshaled only the evidence supporting its contentions and ignored any

evidence to the contrary. (Appellee's Brief at 5.) The Appellee, however, fails to
indicate what facts exactly did the Employer fail to marshal and/or ignore? In its
Statement of Facts section, the Appellee in its brief did not present any additional facts
that were not also presented and analyzed by the Employer in its brief. (Appellee's Brief
at 4, Appellant's Brief at 6-11.) Also, there were many facts presented in the Employer's
brief that did not necessarily bolster the Employer's arguments; for example, the
Claimant testified at the Hearing, and the Employer presented in its brief, that the
Claimant did the best he could and did his job. (Appellant's Brief at 11.)
The Employer clearly attempted to marshal the facts in a comprehensive and
fastidious order, beginning at the first email exchange between the Employer and the
Claimant and continuing through and beyond the Hearing. The Appellee's suggestions
otherwise are without merit.
III.

THE BOARD FAILED TO ADDRESS AND THE APPELLEE CONTINUES
TO AVOID THE SUPPLEMENTAL GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION
THEREBY MITIGATING DAMAGES AFTER LEARNING OF SUCH
SUPPLEMENTAL GROUNDS.
The Board should have at least permitted the Employer to mitigate its damages by

supplementing the grounds for termination of the Claimant as of September 28, 2009, the
date the Employer discovered information that would have otherwise led to the
Claimant's termination. The Board failed entirely to address this matter, upon either
appeal or reconsideration, and the Appellee continues in its brief to dodge the issue. In
Calvert, supra, the court, pursuant to the doctrine of after acquired evidence (which
generally limits a party's damages when the employer discovers information which
6

would have resulted in the employee's termination), precluded an award of damages from
wrongful termination after the date the employer learned that the employee had lied on
his employment application about his criminal past.
The Appellee argues in the present case that the discovery by the Employer that
the Claimant lied on his resume is "ultimately immaterial as the Claimant was not being
discharged for being dishonest" and such is "immaterial in an unemployment setting."
(Appellee's Brief at 22-23.) Such arguments (presuming they made sense otherwise) at a
minimum miss the point of the Calvert case, as well as the doctrine of after acquired
evidence. The discovery by an employer of information that would have resulted in
termination mitigates the employer's damages after ^he employer discovers such
information; whatever damages those might be (including a reimburseable employer
responsible to pay for an employee's unemployment benefits if the employee was
terminated other than for just cause) or whatever the initially stated reason for the
termination. Calvert, supra, at *6. The Employer has been unable to find any case law
that would limit the doctrine of after acquired evidencq to just wrongful termination
cases, as the Appellee baldy asserts further.
In addition, the Board should have considered (upon appeal or reconsideration) the
supplemental evidence presented by the Employer that the Claimant had lied on his
resume, which evidence was submitted to the Board to demonstrate, among other things,
that the Claimant did not act in good faith with respect to the just cause element of
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control. As indicated in the Employer's brief, falsifying job applications and/or work
records itself constitutes just cause for termination. (Appellant's Brief at 31-32.)
The Appellee cites correctly in its brief that the Board by administrative rule will
not accept new evidence on appeal if the evidence was reasonably ctvailable to the
Employer at the time of the hearing. (Appellee's Brief at 9.) As the Employer has
repeatedly noted, however, the information that the Claimant lied on his resume did not
come to light until the day after the Hearing, and such supplemental information, which
itself is just cause for termination and which is also material as to whether the Claimant
acted in good faith, should have been admitted and considered by the Board pursuant to
the Department's own rule. Utah Admin. Code § R994-508-305(2).
IV.

THE EMPLOYER DID DEMONSTRATE THE ELEMENTS OF
KNOWLEDGE AND CONTROL.
While the Employer is hard pressed to find many statements or arguments in the

Appellee's brief without error and while the Employer does not wish to rehash the
arguments made in its brief, the following arguments (in the order presented by the
Appellee) are without merit, even misleading, and demand additional comment.
A.

"This argument is unavailing." (Appellee's Brief at 8.)
The Appellee (not far removed from the Board's outrageous notion that the

Claimant's own admissions on his ability to do the job were entirely immaterial) argues
in its brief that, because the Claimant did not perform satisfactorily in nearly seven
months and because the Claimant never met the Employer's expectations in those
months, therefore "the Employer's goals were clearly beyond his ability to reach."
8

(Appellee's Brief at 8.) The Claimant lacked the ability to perform the job because he
did not do the job? Aside from committing at least one logical fallacy, the Appellee's
argument is also adverse to the Claimant's own admissions, at odds with his decade-long
work history, and adverse to the Employer's discussions with the Claimant's previous
employers about the Claimant. (CA 031, 040, 036, 042, Appellant's Brief at 7.)
The Claimant clearly stated in the Hearing that he had the ability (i.e., capability)
to do the job; "[Attorney for the Employer] And did you say that [raising $15,625 a
month, or $187,500 a year] was reasonable, as you Were capable of doing that?
[Claimant] Yes." (CA 040.) From his initial interview and throughout his employment
with the Employer, the Claimant held himself out to be ati experienced fond raiser, and
he admitted repeatedly throughout the record in this case that he was capable of doing the
job. Such admissions are entirely material as to the issue of whether the Claimant had the
ability (i.e., capability) to do the job. Further, and as the Employer has repeatedly
argued, the Claimant acted in bad faith, or failed to act at all, and such was the real reason
why the Claimant never reached even a fraction of the fund-raising goal, not because he
lacked the ability (i.e., capability) to do the job, as the Appellee illogically suggests in its
brief.
Additionally, the Appellee erroneously argues that, by the Employer checking the
box entitled "Inability to meet employer standards" on the Claimant's pre-printed
separation notice form (which language included the word "inability"), that the Claimant
therefore lacked the ability (i.e., capability) to do the job. (Appellee's Brief at 9.) Such
9

is taken out of context and is downright misleading. The word "inability" in this context
means that the Claimant failed to meet the employer's standards, not that the Claimant
was somehow unable or incapable of actually performing the job. Aside from checking a
box that seemed to fit the situation, the Employer thereafter drafted on the separation
notice form an entire paragraph (entitled "Details of Separation") explaining that the
reason the Claimant was terminated was simply because the Claimant did not do his job
of raising an average of $15,625 per month and did not meet the Employer's standards,
not that he was incapable of doing so. (CA007.)
The Appellee further suggests that, had the Employer had other reasons to
terminate the Claimant, the Empoyer should have indicated as much on the separation
notice form.

(Appellee's Brief at 9, 14.) Such, however, is inconsistent with the

Department's own regulations that there be only one stated reason for separation from
employment; hence the need for employers to utilize forms with boxes of canned reasons
for separation in the first place. See, e.g., Utah Admin. Code section R994-405-1.
B.

"The Employer is incorrect on many levels." (Appellee's Brief at 10.)
The Appellee, like the Board and the ALJ before it, makes the erroneous argument

that the Claimant's fund-raising shortcomings were due to a poor economy rather than
the Claimant failed to act in good faith. (Appellee's Brief at 10.) Of course the poor
economy hampered the Claimant's fund-raising efforts, such is not the point, and the
economy has little, if anything, to do with whether the Claimant made a good faith effort
at his job. The point that the ALJ, the Board, and now the Appellee keep missing is that
10

the Claimant was hired precisely because of the poor economy. The Employer had not
required a professional fund raiser for seven years, but, when the economy started turning
bad in mid 2008, the Employer decided to hire the Claimant to offset the likelihood of a
reduction in funding from the grants that it otherwise obtains. (CA 032.)
The ALJ in her opinion initially made the incorrect assumption in the Hearing that
the Claimant mentioned the poor economy as an excuse for his failure to reach the fundraising goal, the Board followed suit, and now the Appellee makes the same mistake;
"[Claimant] Stephanie had her hands full.

She was running the clinic, managing

employees, working on grants. Many of those faults were due to the economy. All of
these things while juggling, you know, her responsibilities of being a new mom." (CA
038.) The Claimant simply did not testify that the poor economy was the reason for his
failure to reach the fund-raising goal at all. In fact, when specifically asked by the
Employer's counsel about what part the economy played in the Claimant's failure to
obtain (even remotely) his financial goal, the Claimant testified that he had not brought
the poor economy up as an excuse for failing to reach his fund-raising goals but rather
had only brought it up because he knew that the executive director of the Employer could
not raise as much grant funding as she could otherwise; and hence the need for a
professional fundraiser ("[Attorney for the Employer] What part did the economy play in
you not obtaining money? [Claimant] Well, no, I mentioned the economy because of the
grants that [the Employer's executive director] mentioned that she wasn't able to bring
in...."). (CA 042.) Again, the record reflects that the Claimant (by his own admissions)
11

was aware of the poor economy, agreed that the fund-raising goal was reasonable in spite
of the economy, and only brought up the economy at the Hearing to demonstrate that his
fund-raising position was indeed necessary for the Employer to offset dwindling
corporate and government grants. (CA 012-013, 028-032, 041-042.)
The Appellee attempts to bolster this erroneous economic argument further by
suggesting, incorrectly it turns out, that the clinic itself was also not bringing in money
because of the poor economy and that the executive director and the clinic manager for
the Employer together have fallen short of the fund-raising goal for the Claimant,
averaging between the two of them only a total of $10,000 per month for the clinic.
(Appellee's Brief at 11.) The exact language of the testimony is as follows:
[Executive Director] And so we have been unable to afford to rehire
that position. So what we've done instead is our clinic manager has
taken on those responsibilities, and so the clinic manager and I are
now doing the job together. [Judge] And have you raised more funds
than the Claimant? [Executive Director] We have. We've actually
brought in an average of- since the clinic manager has been taking it
on, we have been able to bring in an average of $10,000 per month.
[Attorney for the Employer] In addition to her other duties, right?
[Executive Director] In- yeah, in addition to the grant funding. This
is a separate- this is just simple funding above- this is funds that we
never received in the past. (CA032.)
A couple of points that the Appellee seems to have missed entirely from this exchange:
(1) this testimony does not reflect that the clinic itself was unable to bring in money
(from corporate or government grants or otherwise), in fact the clinic has for nearly
twenty years and continues to this day to raise the requisite funds in order to keep its
12

doors open for business ("[Executive Director for the Employer] between grants and
everything, I was able to bring in $400,000 a year for the clinic"); (2) in addition to their
other full-time duties as executive director (responsible for obtaining the government and
corporate grant funds) and as clinic manager (responsible for the day-to-day operations of
the clinic), the two together performed additionally the Claimant's job of private fund
raising (in arguably a worse economy in late 2009 and 2010 than when the Claimant was
employed by the Employer); and (3) the two employees were able to raise, above and
beyond what the clinic was raising in corporate and government grant funding, an
additional $10,000 per month in private funding from such efforts. In other words, the
above testimony actually reflects that two employees forking less than part-time
between them were able to raise an additional $10,000 p^r month, while the Claimant
working allegedly full-time at the same task was only able to raise on average $3,400 per
month. (CA032.)
The Appellee's attempt in its brief to insinuate that the clinic was not making any
money during this time because of the poor economy and/or that the executive director
and the clinic manager together working full-time at fund raising could not meet the
Claimant's fund-raising goal of $15,625 per month is misleading, not based on the
testimony in the Transcript, and is just plain wrong.
C.

"This argument is not supported by the record." (Appellee's Brief at 14.)
The Appellee states repeatedly (on at least five separate occasions in its brief) that

the Claimant provided uncontroverted testimony that he Had twelve to thirteen events
13

planned for the future after his termination. (Appellee's Brief at 12.) The Appellee is
mistaken, and not only was such testimony entirely disputed by the Employer (on
numerous occasions in the Transcript and elsewhere in the record for that matter), but the
testimony actually reflects that the Claimant was referring to twelve to thirteen events
planned throughout the year—including the seven months that he was employed—and
most of the twelve to thirteen events had already occurred (without much success it turns
out). The exact language of the Transcript provides:
[Attorney for the Employer] Were there any projects that you
completed [past tense] at all? [Claimant] Any- yes, there were
several projects that I completed [past tense]. [Attorney for the
Employer] Can you tell us what those were? [Claimant] Yeah, I- the
events that I planned [past tense] throughout the year, which, you
know, I had 12 to 13 events that I had planned [past tense], and these
were events, you know, that were in the future. She mentioned the
Grizzlies event that we did [past tense]. I worked [past tense] on an
event with- [Attorney for the Employer] (Inaudible)- [Judge]
Everybody stop just a minute, Mr. Keele? [Attorney for the
Employer] Yes. [Judge] Let him finish answering, and don't
interrupt him. [Attorney for the Employer] Okay. [Judge] Go ahead.
[Claimant] It was [past tense] the Utah Grizzlies event. There was a
jersey event that we were going to do [past tense] with the Utah
Blaze where all their jerseys would be donated back to the clinic.
And because of the economy, the Utah Blaze folded up. But that
was an event that we had [past tense]. We had [past tense] bring
smiles tasting gala, which we weren't able to finish basically due to
poor, you know, lack of planning and all this. They- you know,
there were [past tense] afraid to go on with the event for whatever
reason. We had [past tense] two golf tournaments scheduled; a
walking for smiles walk. We had [past tense] a gala that I was
working on with the founder where he had asked President Thomas
S. Monson to be honored at that gala. And he said if it works with
14

his schedule, he'd be happy to do it. We were looking at doing that
in September. I was working on the planning of that. I don't know
if I mentioned the motorcycle ride. There was [past tense] a
motorcycle ride. And Pm trying to go off of memory because they
have all the projections and all of the files, so. [Judge] Okay. Any
other questions, Mr. Keele? [Attorney for the Employer] Yeah, we
have lots of questions. Let's talk about the hockey night. How
much - [Claimant] Yes, we completed hockpy night.... (CA 040041.)
This testimony reflects that there were only two future events, a proposed gala event with
President Monson and a motorcycle ride, the Claimant w^s apparently working on that
were to occur after he was terminated. The initial question posed to the Claimant above
was to name the events he had completed, and (aside from the motorcycle ride and the
President Monson event) the events mentioned in the above testimony had either already
occurred or were canceled entirely. The Employer does not dispute that the Claimant had
twelve to thirteen events planned for the entire year (as the Claimant testified), but the
Employer very much disputes that the Claimant had, and such is not evident from the
above testimony or elsewhere in the record, twelve to thirteen events planned after his
termination. The Appellee states that the
Employer also argues that the Claimant did not have twelve to
thirteen events planned after he was discharged, arguing instead that
the Claimant only had three events planned. This argument is not
supported by the record [referring presumably to the Affidavits
wherein the executive director and the clinic manager discuss in
detail the remaining three future events that were actually planned
by the Claimant and that had to be canceled for various reasons,
including the Claimant's poor planning with respect to those events].
The Claimant provided uncontroverted testimony that he had
15

planned twelve to thirteen events for the future, which would have
occurred after the date of his discharge. The Employer failed to
provide testimony or evidence that the Claimant only had three
events planned. (Appellee's Brief at 14.)
So, it is the Appellee's position that the Employer's assertion in its brief that there were
in fact only three events planned in the future was not supported by the record
(presumably not supported because the three events that were in fact scheduled after the
Claimant's termination were detailed in the Affidavits), but the twelve to thirteen events
referenced by the Claimant in the above testimony was, according to the Appellee, fully
supported and uncontroverted? Such a position is simply not true.
The Appellee's substantial reliance on (as was the Board's before it) the
Claimant's statement regarding twelve to thirteen future events is not supported by the
testimony (or by the rest of the record), and the Claimant's statement further has been,
and continues to be currently, ardently challenged by the Employer ever since it was
uttered. (See, e.g., CA 109-110.)
D.

"The Employer was also unable to articulate a single event that was
postponed or that failed due to the Claimant's poor performance."
(Appellee's Brief at 12.)
The Appellee erroneously argues that "the Employer was also unable to articulate

a single event that was postponed or that failed due to the Claimant's poor performance."
(Appellee's Brief at 12.) In addition to the Claimant's own testimony (quoted in Section
C above) that he failed to plan the "bring smiles tasting event" properly, the executive
director for the Employer also testified credibly at the Hearing (and clarified further in
16

the Affidavits) that the Claimant failed to properly plan events generally and the Appellee
also—in the following paragraph to its statement that the Employer failed to articulate a
single event—highlights a "toasting gala" event that was Hot able to be completed due to
the Claimant's lack of proper planning; "The toasting gala was not able to be completed
due to lack of planning." (CA 019-021, 031, Appellee's Brief at 12-13.) The Employer
further noted the toasting gala event in the Log; "As of today the clinic stands to lose
$3,900 because only 18 tickets have been sold. We need to sell 50 to break even. The
board has decided to postpone the event due to insufficient ticket sales and lack of
sponsorship." (CA010.)
As with most of the other points argued in the Appellee's brief, the Appellee's
present argument is without merit.
E.

"This argument is unsupported by the record as the Employer failed to
provide testimony that it was flexible regarding the Claimant's timecard
requirements..." (Appellee's Brief at 15.)
The Board in its decision erroneously determined that, by requiring the Claimant

to clock in and out each day, such affected his ability tp do his job as a fund raiser.
(Appellant's Brief at Addendum B.) As if the Claimant would have been successful at
his job had he only not been forced to account for his time by physically clocking in or
out? This argument is just nonsense.
The Employer argued in its brief that the Claimant did not physically have to be
present at the clinic to clock in and out; what was required of him as an hourly employee
was that he had to accurately account for the hours he worked and for which he was
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expected to be paid. (Appellant's Brief at 28.) In response, the Appellee in its brief
states that: "In fact, the Claimant was specifically required to clock in and out because
the Employer took issue with him handwriting his timecard.

(R, 035: 35-41.)"

(Appellee's Brief at 15.) As support for this absurd suggestion, the Appellee cites to the
Transcript where the executive director of the Employer recounts how she caught the
Claimant falsifying his time card by handwriting three hours worked longer than when
the Employer knew the Claimant had worked.
The Employer did not take issue with the Claimant handwriting his timecard, as
the Appellee mistakenly suggests; the Employer simply took issue with the Claimant
falsifying his time card, i.e., the issue was with the theft and not the handwriting. Once
again, the Appellee's argument otherwise is without merit.
F.

"These arguments are ultimately unavailing as they form no part of the basis
for the Employer's decision to discharge the Claimant." (Appellee's Brief at
16.)
The Appellee argues that the Claimant's falsifying his timecard and lying on his

resume are "unavailing" facts because the Employer did not terminate the Claimant for
these incidents. (Appellee's Brief at 16.) Whether the Claimant was terminated for
falsifying his time card (or later based on the supplemental grounds for termination
learned for lying on his resume) is not the point. These incidents were raised by the
Employer in its brief (and before the Board upon appeal and reconsideration) in support
of the Employer's argument that the Claimant could not have acted in good faith (as the
Board erroneously concluded based simply on the Claimant's testimony) but instead
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acted in bad faith. (Appellant's Brief at 29-31.) Such incidents are entirely relevant to
the question of whether the Claimant acted in good faith, nek whether the actual incidents
themselves produced a particular action or result by thd Employer, as the Appellee
suggests they must.
The Appellee further argues that, since the lying on the resume was not discovered
until after the Hearing, such is not supported by the record and is also immaterial. As
discussed above, it is the Employer's position that the lying on the resume is a part of the
record in this case and further that such supplemental caus^ for termination should have
been addressed by the Board. It is also the Employer's contention that lying on a resume,
and obtaining the job on false pretenses in the first place, is very much material as to the
question of whether the Claimant was acting in good faith with respect to that job.
The record also contains, and the Employer has made repeated attempts to
highlight, numerous and various other incidents where the fclaimant acted in bad faith.
The Appellee broadly suggests in its brief that such incidents are either unavailing or
immaterial with respect to demonstrating a lack of good faitfi because the Employer did
not terminate the Claimant for such incidents or because th$ Employer otherwise "dealt
sufficiently" with such isolated incidents as they occurred

(Appellee's Brief at 17.)

Again, how (or even whether) the Employer handled the Claimant's various infractions
has nothing to do with the fact that the infractions occurred (whether an isolated instance
or on multiple occasions), and such infractions are entirely material as to the question of
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whether the Claimant acted in good faith or not. As with much of the rest of Appellee's
brief, the Appellee's suggestion otherwise just does not logically follow.
The Appellee would have this Court defer to the Board's decision that the
Claimant acted in good faith but any attempt by the Employer based on the 193-page
record (which record was again prepared and submitted by the Board) to demonstrate
otherwise is simply labeled by the Appellee in its brief as either unavailing or immaterial.
It is the Employer's position that, taken together, the various incidents described in its
brief demonstrate that the Board's conclusion that the Claimant acted in good faith is not
based on the record; again the only evidence of the Claimant's alleged good faith in the
record is the Claimant's own, and very much contested, testimony.
G.

"The Employer's argument that the Claimant understood the Employer's
fund raising expectations fails on many levels." (Appellee's Brief at 18.)
The Appellee makes the illogical argument that, since the Claimant had twelve to

thirteen events planned for the upcoming year, since he understood he had to raise
$187,500 annually (but did not apparently understand that such equates to $15,625
monthly), and since the Claimant "likely felt he could reach that yearly goal," therefore
the Claimant did not understand (i.e., did not have knowledge of) the Employer's
monthly fund-raising expectations of him. (Appellee's Brief at 18-19.) Therefore, the
Employer failed to demonstrate the knowledge element of just cause. This argument also
just does not make any sense.
First of all, as discussed in some detail above, there were not in fact twelve to
thirteen events planned in the future, arguably only two or three (none of which were
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actually able to be conducted). Next, the Claimant testified that he specifically knew
what the Employer expected of him, whether calculated monthly or annually; "[Attorney
for the Employer] do you know that you had to obtain $15,000 a month roughly, or
$187,000 [the exact number was $187,500] all together? [Claimant] Yes, all together.
That was the expectation...." (CA 040.) Further, the Board itself concluded and stated in
its decision that the Claimant understood the job requirements; "the Claimant understood
the fund raising expectations." (Appellant's Brief at Addendum B.) It simply does not
follow that the possibility of future events beyond the Claimant's termination date
(whether three, twelve, or a thousand), which events in theory could have accomplished
the $187,500 goal for the entire year, equates to a lack of knowledge of the Employer's
expectations to raise funds for the Employer in the annual amount of $187,500 (later
reduced by the Employer to only $60,000 a year to cover the Claimant's wages), or
$15,625 a month, or roughly $520 a day, or $20 an hour, or 133 cents a minute.
The Appellee further mistakenly argues that, with the possibility of reaching the
$187,500 annual goal in the remaining months of the year (again, based on the
nonexistent future twelve to thirteen events) and because of the Employer's tolerance of
the Claimant's poor performance in fund raising during his seven months of employment,
such equates to the conclusion that the Claimant "could not possibly have understood"
that his job was in jeopardy or that he did not know what the Employer's expectations
were in the first place. (Appellee's Brief at 19.) Nowhete in the record is there any
evidence that the Employer tolerated the Claimant's poor performance; instead the record
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is replete with instances where the Employer attempted (at least monthly) to get the
Claimant to do his job, and the Claimant was in fact terminated for poor performance
when it became clear to the Employer's board of directors that he would never do his job.
(CA 009-011, 030-035.)

It simply does not logically follow that the Employer's

tolerance (or intolerance) of the Claimant's poor performance has anything to do with
whether the Claimant knew what the Employer expected of him or whether he knew that
his job was in jeopardy for failing to meet those expectations.
As indicated in the Employer's brief, the Claimant subjectively knew what was
expected of him, and Rule 2 simply does not require the Employer demonstrate anything
further than that, including whether or not the Claimant knew that he had to raise funds in
the amount of 33 cents every minute. (Appellant's Brief at 12-15.)
H.

"However, the log was entered as Exhibit 9 during the hearing and never
discussed or referenced again/5 (Appellee's Brief at 19.)
The Appellee argues that the Log was never "discussed or referenced" after

introduction at the Hearing and that the Employer further failed to authenticate or testify
as to its contents. (CA 009-011, Appellee's Brief at 19.) This is simply ridiculous. As
discussed above, the Department requested and obtained the Log in connection with its
own initial investigation of the Claimant's initial unemployment claim, the Log is entitled
"2009 Disciplinary Action Log Stephen Vuyk", and it speaks for itself. (CA 009-011.)
The Log was not entered into evidence by the Employer, which the Appellee seems to
have assumed. Rather, the ALJ entered the Log into the record, and further asked the
Employer to authenticate it; "[Judge] Exhibit 9 is a document from the Employer titled
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2009 disciplinary action log. Exhibit 10 is the second page of that document. And
Exhibit 11 is the final page of that document.... [Executive Director for the Employer]
Yes, it is. [Judge] .. .The documents then are admitted as evidence." (CA 028-29.)
The Appellee further contends that the Employer made no attempt to describe the
events in the Log. (Appellee's Brief at 19.) Such is also not true. The Employer has
repeatedly discussed and made reference to the Log (before losing count, at least ten
times in the various memorandum before the Board, numerous times in the Affidavits,
and multiple times in the Employer's brief). (For examples of the Employer's previous
discussion of this issue, see Appellant's Brief at 15-16 or CA 085-086.) The reason the
Log was not more referenced in the Hearing is likely because it was not challenged by the
Claimant, the Employer, or the ALJ.

Indeed, the plain language of the Log (as

authenticated by the Employer at the Hearing) contains the exact dates and the particular
employment action taken by the Employer with respect to the Claimant. The Appellee's
attempts (as well as the Board's) to discount this document are entirely without merit.
Further, and without any legal support, the Appellee makes several conclusory
statements regarding whether the Log constitutes a written warning (or warnings); (1)
"Certainly the rule [presumably the Appellee is referring to Rule 2] contemplates that the
Claimant be given a copy of the written warning so that he can correct his objectionable
conduct" and (2) "Preparing a written warning which a claimant never sees cannot
comply with the requirements of the knowledge." (Appellee's Brief at 19.) As discussed
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at length in the Employer's brief, the language of Rule 2 simply does not provide the
basis for such conclusions. (Appellant's Brief at 13-14, Addendum A.)
The Board all but insinuated in its decision that the Employer fabricated the Log to
bolster its arguments, and the Appellee in its brief continues the attack. Such skepticism
and criticism as to the Log's authenticity is, however, entirely without merit.
I.

"The record does not support this." (Appellee's Brief at 21.)
The Log indicates that the Claimant was warned numerous times throughout the

months of January to April 2009 that he would lose his job and/or be disciplined if he
failed to do his job. (CA 009-011.)

The Log further indicates that, on February 12,

2009, and as further supported by the testimony of the executive director for the
Employer, the Claimant was specifically informed that he would be terminated after the
end of March if the Claimant did not earn $5,000 a month, which was roughly the cost of
the Claimant's wages. (CA 010, 030.) The Appellee, however, argues that the record
does not support this. Again, the Log (entered properly into evidence by the ALJ,
authenticated by the Employer in the Hearing, and made by the Board a part of the record
in this case) makes it plain that the Claimant was specifically told he could expect to be
terminated if he failed to reach the goal. The Appellee's mere suggestion otherwise is
entirely without merit.
Further, because the Employer did not immediately terminate the Claimant after
he failed to make the requisite amount by the end of the March deadline, the Appellee
makes the absurd argument that the Claimant therefore could not have anticipated the
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negative effect of such conduct. In fact, the Employer did terminate the Claimant a
couple of weeks after the March deadline after it had obtained the board of director's
permission to do so. (CA 009.) It just does not logically follow that the failure of the
Employer to immediately discipline the Claimant has anything to do with whether the
Claimant could have anticipated the negative effect of failing to meet the March deadline.
As with the Appellee's other arguments, the present is again without merit.
CONCLUSION
As the Employer demonstrated the elements of knowledge and control with
respect to the termination of the Claimant, and as the Emplqyer has also supplemented its
grounds for termination of the Claimant, the Claimant was terminated for just cause. The
Employer, as a reimbursable employer, is therefore entitled to a refund of unemployment
benefits the Claimant has received or will receive.
Dated this i ^ d a y of June 2010.

UL

Kamron Keele
Attorney for Appellant Salt Lake Donated
Dental Services, Inc.
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